This document outlines suggested steps
for determining if your system has been compromised. System
administrators can use this information to look for several
types of break-ins. We encourage you to review all sections
of this document and modify your systems to close potential
In addition to the information in this document, we provide
three companion documents that may help you:
We also encourage you to check with your vendor(s) regularly for
any updates or new patches that relate to your systems.
Look For Signs That Your System May Have
Note that all action taken during the course of an investigation
should be in accordance with your organization's policies
Examine log files for connections from
unusual locations or other unusual activity. For example,
look at your 'last' log, process accounting, all logs
created by syslog, and other security logs. If your firewall
or router writes logs to a different location than the
compromised system, remember to check these logs also.
Note that this is not foolproof unless you log to append-only
media; many intruders edit log files in an attempt to
hide their activity.
Look for setuid and setgid files (especially
setuid root files) everywhere on your system. Intruders
often leave setuid copies of /bin/sh or /bin/time around
to allow them root access at a late time. The UNIX find(1)
program can be used to hunt for setuid and/or setgid files.
For example, you can use the following commands to find
setuid root files and setgid kmem files on the entire
Note that the above examples search the entire directory
tree, including NFS/AFS mounted file systems. Some find(1)
commands support an "-xdev" option to avoid
searching those hierarchies. For example:
find / -user root -perm -4000 -print -xdev
Another way to search for setuid files is to use the ncheck(8)
command on each disk partition. For example, use the following
command to search for setuid files and special devices
on the disk partition /dev/rsd0g:
ncheck -s /dev/rsd0g
Check your system binaries to make
sure that they haven't been altered. We've seen intruders
change programs on UNIX systems such as login, su, telnet,
netstat, ifconfig, ls, find, du, df, libc, sync, any binaries
referenced in /etc/inetd.conf, and other critical network
and system programs and shared object libraries. Compare
the versions on your systems with known good copies, such
as those from your initial installation media. Be careful
of trusting backups; your backups could also contain Trojan
Trojan horse programs may produce the same standard
checksum and timestamp as the legitimate version. Because
of this, the standard UNIX sum(1) command and the timestamps
associated with the programs are not sufficient to determine
whether the programs have been replaced. The use of
cmp(1), MD5, Tripwire, and other cryptographic checksum
tools is sufficient to detect these Trojan horse programs,
provided the checksum tools themselves are kept secure
and are not available for modification by the intruder.
Additionally, you may want to consider using a tool
(PGP, for example) to "sign" the output generated by
MD5 or Tripwire, for future reference.
Examine all the files that are run
by 'cron' and 'at.' We've seen intruders leave back doors
in files run from 'cron' or submitted to 'at.' These techniques
can let an intruder back on the system (even after you
believe you had addressed the original compromise). Also,
verify that all files/programs referenced (directly or
indirectly) by the 'cron' and 'at' jobs, and the job files
themselves, are not world-writable.
Check for unauthorized services. Inspect
/etc/inetd.conf for unauthorized additions or changes.
In particular, search for entries that execute a shell
program (for example, /bin/sh or /bin/csh) and check all
programs that are specified in /etc/inetd.conf to verify
that they are correct and haven't been replaced by Trojan
Also check for legitimate services that you have commented
out in your /etc/inetd.conf. Intruders may turn on a
service that you previously thought you had turned off,
or replace the inetd program with a Trojan horse program.
Examine the /etc/passwd file on the
system and check for modifications to that file. In particular,
look for the unauthorized creation of new accounts, accounts
with no passwords, or UID changes (especially UID 0) to
Check your system and network configuration
files for unauthorized entries. In particular, look for
'+' (plus sign) entries and inappropriate non-local host
names in /etc/hosts.equiv, /etc/hosts.lpd, and in all
.rhosts files (especially root, uucp, ftp, and other system
accounts) on the system. These files should not be world-writable.
Furthermore, confirm that these files existed prior to
any intrusion and were not created by the intruder.
Look everywhere on the system for unusual
or hidden files (files that start with a period and are
normally not shown by 'ls'), as these can be used to hide
tools and information (password cracking programs, password
files from other systems, etc.). A common technique on
UNIX systems is to put a hidden directory in a user's
account with an unusual name, something like '...' or
'.. ' (dot dot space) or '..^G' (dot dot control-G). Again,
the find(1) program can be used to look for hidden files,
Also, files with names such as '.xx' and '.mail' have
been used (that is, files that might appear to be normal).
Examine all machines on the local
network when searching for signs of intrusion. Most of
the time, if one host has been compromised, others on
the network have been, too. This is especially true for
networks where NIS is running or where hosts trust each
other through the use of .rhosts files and/or /etc/hosts.equiv
files. Also, check hosts for which your users share .rhosts
For further information about the types
of attack that have recently been reported to the CERT
Coordination Center and for a list of new or updated files
that are available for anonymous FTP, see our past CERT
Summaries, available in the directory
The information on the form helps us provide the best
assistance, as it enables us to understand the scope of
the incident, to determine if your incident may be related
to any other incidents that have been reported to us,
and to identify trends in intruder activities.
To subscribe to the CERT mailing list for advisories and bulletins,
send email to firstname.lastname@example.org.
Please include in the body of your message
* "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
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